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ABSTRACT 
Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth values of the 
proposition accepted or, if it is a complex proposition, its propositional contents. Extensional 
evidence is non-intensional evidence. Someone can accept a complex proposition, but deny 
its logical consequences in two circumstances: (1) when her acceptance is based on 
intensional evidence, while the logical consequences of the proposition presuppose the 
acceptance of extensional evidence, e.g., she can refuse the logical consequence of a 
proposition she accepts because she doesn’t know what the truth-values of its propositional 
contents; (2) when she accepts a proposition based on extensional evidence, but thinks that 
this evidence is insufficient to establish its logical consequences, which would require 
intensional evidence. It is argued that this tension is responsible for the counter-intuitive 
aspects of the material account of conditionals involving the negation of conditionals, 
hypothetical syllogism, contraposition and the inferential passage from disjunctions to 
conditionals (or-to-if). This tension is also behind some known puzzles involving 
conditionals, namely, conditional stand-offs, Adam pairs, the cheating partner example, jump-
out conditionals, the problem of counterfactuals and the burglar’s puzzle. It is shown that this 
tension is always dissolved in favour of extensional evidence, since intensional evidence is 
defeasible, while extensional evidence is not. Thus, it is irrational to deny the logical 
consequences of an accepted proposition due to its reliance on intensional evidence and 
ignorance of its extensional evidence. 
1. TWO TYPES OF EVIDENCE 
Intensional evidence involves any reasons 
to accept a proposition that are not the truth-
values of the proposition or, if it’s a 
complex proposition, its propositional 
contents. The fact that there is a known 
connection between red spots and measles is 
an intensional evidence to accept the 
conditional “If John has red spots, he has 
measles”. Intensional evidence requires a 
defeasible reasoning that supports the 
proposition, but can be defeated by 
additional information. The presence of red 
spots is an indicator of measles, but is 
possible that you do not have measles after 
all. It was just a rash. Intensional evidence 
only suffices for the acceptability of a 
conditional. It is inconclusive evidence. 
Extensional evidence is non-intensional 
evidence. Knowing that John had red spots 
and measles is an extensional evidence to 
accept the same conditional. Extensional 
evidence is involved in a deductively valid 
reasoning. The truth of both antecedent and 
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consequent are not only compelling, but 
indefeasible. It is not possible to have red 
spots and measles when it is not the case 
that if John has red spots, he has measles. 
Extensional evidence suffices for the truth 
of a conditional. It is conclusive evidence . 1
Extensional evidence does not imply 
classical logic. The ideas that the truth of 
both A and B are sufficient evidence to 
accept A → B , and that A and ¬B are 2
sufficient evidence to deny A → B, are 
assumed by most conditional logics. 
However, the assumption that ¬A or B are 
sufficient evidence to accept A → B is a 
prerogative of classical logic alone. As we 
shall see further along, of the problems 
considered, only one about negated 
conditionals involves classical logic.  
The distinction between intensional 
evidence and extensional evidence is not 
restricted to complex propositions, but also 
holds for simple propositions. That the 
weather forecast for tomorrow indicates 
heavy rain is an intensional evidence to 
think that there will be heavy rain on August 
2, while the occurrence of heavy rain in 
August 2 is an extensional evidence to 
accept that there is heavy rain on August 2. 
The fact that some trustworthy individual 
told me that the last match was canceled is 
an intensional evidence to think that the last 
match was canceled, while the fact itself 
that match was canceled is an extensional 
evidence that the match was canceled. It is 
also obvious that a true statement can be 
used as intensional evidence for a false 
statement, but never an extensional 
evidence.  
The difference between intensional and 
extensional evidence suggests why the first 
has more epistemic relevance than the later. 
The use of extensional evidence flies in the 
face of our epistemic practice, which often 
involves ignorance about the truth values of 
the propositions that are being evaluated. 
When we are considering whether to accept 
a proposition A, we do not know whether A 
is true or not. This requires the use of 
intensional evidence. 
The preference for intensional evidence 
is even more pronounced in the case of 
complex propositions such as conditionals. 
When we decide whether to accept or not  A 
→ B, we look for intensional evidence. The 
reasons for this are plenty. First, we are 
usually in an epistemic position where we 
do not know the truth values of its 
propositional constituents, i.e., we do not 
know the truth values A and B. Secondly, 
conditionals are used to express connections 
between things (state of affairs, facts, 
properties, principles, etc), and in order to 
determine whether these connections hold 
we need intensional evidence. Thirdly, there 
is an epistemic requirement over the 
inferential use of conditionals in the sense 
that the only way to show that the premisses 
of a modus ponens or a modus tollens are 
well confirmed without begging the 
question or making the argument unsound, 
is by appealing to intensional evidence that 
confirms the first premise . Fourthly, the 3
 The distinction between intensional and extensional evidence is borrowed and adapted from Stevenson (1970), 1
who uses the distinction in a more restricted sense. According to Stevenson (1970: 31), a ‘body of evidence that 
confirms p ⊃ q is intensional just in case it does not confirm the stronger proposition, -p, and does not confirm 
the stronger proposition, q’, whereas extensional evidence is merely nonintensional evidence. The distinction 
used in this article is more comprehensive, since it is not restricted to the material conditional, but also 
encompass any simple or complex proposition. The related argumentation presented in this article involving 
other concepts associated with this distinction (e.g., defeasible and conclusive evidence; acceptability and truth 
conditions; criteria of truth and truth conditions) are neither advanced or endorsed by Stevenson. 
 I will use ‘→’ for indicative conditionals, ‘⊃’ for the material implication and the capital letters A, B, C…. for 2
propositional variables. The symbols and variables quoted will be modified to ensure that the notation remains 
uniform.
 Stevenson (1970: 30); Johnson (1921).3
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acceptance of intensional evidence for a 
simple proposition implies in the acceptance 
of extensional evidence for that proposition, 
but the acceptance of intensional evidence 
for a complex proposition does not imply 
the acceptance of extensional evidence for 
that complex proposition. If one has 
intensional evidence to accept A, then she 
will think that A is true; but if one has 
intensional evidence to accept A → B, one 
can think that A → B is true without making 
a compromise to the truth values of A and B. 
Despite the omnipresence of intensional 
evidence, systems of logics will invariably 
treat conditionals as a function of some 
kind. This is particularly evident with 
classical logic, which treats connectives as 
truth functions and demands omniscience of 
truth values in order to ascertain the validity 
of inferential forms. The whole system is 
based on the presumption of a type of 
evidence, the extensional kind, which is 
denied by our epistemic practices. It is not 
surprising then that a variety of puzzles and 
counter-intuitive examples pop up when we 
try to apply the basics of logic to everyday 
examples of conditional reasoning.  
2. THE RELEVANCE OF EXTENSIONAL EVIDENCE 
The possible extensional reasons to accept A 
→ B are A&B, ¬A&B and ¬A&¬B. Is it true 
that that these combinations of the truth 
values are never used to establish a 
conditional’s truth value? Not quite. A&B is 
enough to accept puzzle conditionals (‘I 
know where the prize is, but all I will tell 
you is that if it is not in the garden, it is in 
the attic’), Kennedy shooter conditionals 
(‘If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone 
else did’), or incidental conditionals where 
A and B are coincidently true (‘If he leaves 
at ten, a car accident will happen’). 
How about the other circumstances, 
when ¬A&B is true or ¬A&¬B is true? 
¬A&B can be a reason to accept even-if 
conditionals (‘Even if he felt embarrassed, 
he showed no signs of it’), since they are 
accepted when B is assumed as true 
regardless of the truth value of A. ¬A&¬B is 
enough to accept puzzle conditionals and 
sportscast play-by-play commentary 
conditionals (‘If Messi waits just a second 
longer, he scores on that play’) . ¬A&¬B 4
can also be a reason to accept Dutchman 
conditionals (‘If John’s speaking the truth, 
I'm a Dutchman’).  
Grice also presented a variety of 
c o n t e x t s w h e r e i t i s i m p l i c i t l y 
acknowledged that the reasons employed to 
assert conditionals are extensional. 
According to Grice, the conditional ‘If 
Smith is in the library, he is working’ would 
normally carry the implication that the 
speaker has intensional grounds to back his 
claim—what Grice called Indirectness 
Condition. But the speaker could opt out 
from this implication adding: ‘I know just 
where Smith is and what he is doing, but all 
I will tell you is that if he is in the library he 
is working’. The speaker asserted this 
conditional because he had just looked and 
found him in the library, but wants to play a 
game with his interlocutor .   5
Grice also presented the example of a 
guessing game: 
You may know the kind of logical puzzle in 
which you are given the names of a number 
of persons in a room, their professions, and 
their current occupations, without being told 
directly which person belongs to which 
 von Fintel (2012: 467).4
 Grice (1989: 59).5
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profession or is engaged in which 
occupation. You are then given a number of 
pieces of information, from which you have 
to assign each profession and each 
occupation to a named individual. Suppose 
that I am propounding such a puzzle … 
about real people whom I can see but my 
hearer cannot. I could perfectly properly 
say, at some point, “If Jones has black 
(pieces) then Mrs. Jones has black too.” … 
indeed, the total content of this utterance 
would be just what would be asserted 
(according to truth-table definition) by 
saying “Jones has black ⊃ J Mrs. Jones has 
black.” Thus one undertaking of the 
previous action has been fulfilled .  6
In this game the use of information is 
explicitly extensional. The hearer asserts the 
conditional because he knows what the truth 
values of the conditional’s constituents are, 
and he wants his hearer to make an educated 
guess using this conditional as a piece of 
information. Finally, Grice ask us to 
consider a game of bridge with special 
conventions in which a bid of five no 
trumps is announced to one’s opponents as 
meaning ‘If I have a red king, I also have a 
black king’ . This conditional is extensional, 7
through and through.  
3. EXTENSIONAL EVIDENCE BEATS INTENSIONAL EVIDENCE 
One way to deny the logical significance of 
intensional evidence is by observing the 
contrast of the defeasible character of 
intensional evidence with the conclusive 
aspect of extensional evidence. Intensional 
evidence is used in a defeasible reasoning 
that supports the proposition, but can be 
defeated by additional information. The 
presence of red spots is an indicator of 
measles, but it is possible that a person with 
red spots does not have measles after all. It 
is just a rash. Extensional evidence is 
involved in a deductively valid reasoning. It 
is not possible that Socrates had red spots 
and measles, and still be false that if 
Socrates has red spots, he has measles. The 
truth of both the antecedent and the 
consequent represents conclusive evidence 
that the conditional is true. Extensional 
evidence suffices for the truth of a 
conditional, but intensional evidence only 
suffices for the acceptability of a 
conditional, since it is not conclusive 
evidence. 
It is also undeniable that extensional 
evidence always prevails over intensional 
evidence. Suppose that I assert about a fair 
coin: ‘If you flip that coin, it will come up 
heads’. But since the coin toss has at least 
50% of resulting in tails, there is no 
intensional evidence to accept the 
conditional. Consequently, my assertion was 
unjustified, which induces you to promptly 
deny the conditional. But suppose that after 
this conditional was asserted, I flipped the 
coin and it came up heads. The result of 
flipping the coin provides extensional 
evidence that the conditional is not only 
acceptable, but true. Your negation was a 
mistake, after all. Now, imagine that the 
conditions were a little different, and that I 
knew that the coin toss was rigged to ensure 
that the result of the toss will be always 
heads. Knowing this, I assert: ‘If you flip 
the coin, it will come up heads’. The same 
conditional would be acceptable in this 
modified circumstance, since now I have 
intensional evidence to accept it. But 
suppose that despite my excellent 
intensional evidence the result of the toss 
turn out to be tails (perhaps the rigged 
mechanism failed, etc.). Again, extensional 
evidence has the last word on the issue. 
What ultimately determines the truth value 
 Grice (1989: 60).6
 Grice (I989: 60).7
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of the conditional are the truth values of its 
propositional constituents.  
The predominance of extensional 
evidence over intensional evidence happens 
because intensional evidence can vary with 
time and it is based on imperfect 
information. But if an epistemic agent were 
to correct her beliefs given the opportunity, 
the optimal information will be always 
extensional, since our intensional based 
beliefs will ultimately be grounded in facts 
that determine the truth values of the 
relevant propositions, i.e., extensional 
evidence. Thus, the tension between the 
appeal to intensional evidence in negated 
conditionals and its classical logical 
consequences will always be resolved in 
favour of the later, since the intensional 
evidence will inevitably have to come to 
terms with the extensional evidence. 
Notice that just as our epistemic biases 
may favour intensional evidence over 
extensional evidence, they may also favour 
acceptability conditions, i.e., the conditions 
where a proposition is acceptable or not, 
over truth conditions, i.e., the conditions 
where a proposition is true or not. The 
negation of a conditional does not seem to 
imply a conjunction if we rely only on 
acceptability conditions, but just as 
intensional evidence is not a proper 
substitute for extensional evidence, 
acceptability conditions are not a proper 
substitute for truth conditions. We should 
not confuse claims about what is acceptable 
or unacceptable with claims about what is 
objectively true or false. One proposition 
may be acceptable for an epistemic agent 
due to the intensional evidence available 
and yet be revealed as false; or it could be 
unacceptable due to lack of intensional 
evidence and it turn out to be true. 
Considerations associated with acceptability 
conditions cannot be a metric to determine 
which logic we should use because they rely 
on the vagaries of our epistemic constraints, 
whereas truth conditions are determined by 
matters of fact that are independent of 
epistemic agents and their epistemic 
situation. 
Similarly, it would be tempting to argue 
that natural language conditionals should 
not be interpreted as material since the truth 
conditions of the material conditional are 
unsuitable as criteria to decide whether a 
given conditional is true or not. In these 
cases, we use intensional evidence, not a 
calculus of the truth values of the 
antecedent and the consequent. But this 
criticism falls in the trap of confusing truth 
conditions with criteria of truth. Truth 
conditions have logical significance for they 
determine the conditions in which a 
proposition is true or false, but criteria of 
truth only have epistemic significance 
because they are standards used in contexts 
of imperfect information to distinguish 
whether a given proposition is true or false, 
i.e., in contexts where the only evidence 
available to asses the relevant proposition is 
intensional. The use of criteria of truth is 
similar to the use of intensional evidence in 
the sense that it is fallible, e.g., the 
testimony of experts is a criterion to decide 
whether I should believe in a proposition 
about a topic that is outside my area of 
expertise, but is a fallible guide since the 
experts could be wrong. Truth conditions 
are the circumstances that determine 
whether a proposition is true or false. Thus, 
it does not matter that the truth conditions of 
the material conditional are unsuitable as a 
criterion of truth in contexts of imperfect 
information and scarce extensional 
evidence, since truth conditions are not 
criteria of truth and should not be judged as 
such. 
The epistemic bias against the material 
conditional is also untenable in different 
way. It assumes that the acceptance of a 
conjunction that follows from the negation 
of a conditional requires extensional 
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evidence, but it is obvious that conjunctions 
can be accepted on intensional grounds. I 
can accept the proposition “The weather 
tomorrow will be rainy and cold” because I 
trust in the weather forecast prediction that 
tomorrow will be rainy and cold. In this 
case, the evidence I used to accept the 
conjunction is intensional. An intensional-
based conjunction will only require 
extensional evidence in the sense that once 
we accept that the conjunction is true, we 
also make commitments to the truth values 
of its conjuncts, namely, we also accept that 
both conjuncts are true. But that is very 
different from saying that a conjunction 
cannot be accepted on intensional grounds. 
This shows that the contrary intuition 
against the material conditional must be 
formulated in a different way if it wants to 
be taken seriously.  
4. THE NEGATION OF CONDITIONALS  
If indicative conditionals are material, from 
the negation of ¬(A → B) it follows A&¬B. 
This assumption faces counter-intuitive 
instances when someone accepts the 
premise due to intensional evidence, but the 
conclusion is a conjunction he ignores. For 
example, if I deny the conditional ‘If God 
exists then the prayers of evil men will be 
answered’ I must admit that, ‘God exists 
and the prayers of evil men will not be 
answered’ . Thus, from the negation of a 8
simple conditional, I can prove that God 
exists. This is implausible, because someone 
could refuse the conditional based on 
assumptions about the moral dispositions of 
God even if she does not believe in the 
existence of God.  
Edgington  presented another version of 9
the trivial proof of God’s existence that 
relies on a different conditional: ‘If God 
doesn’t exist, then it is not the case that if I 
pray my prayers will be answered (by 
Him)’. Intuitively, this conditional is true. 
However, if I do not pray, the antecedent of 
the conditional in the consequent is false, 
which implies that the negation of the 
conditional is false. Thus, the only way to 
maintain the assumption that the whole 
conditional is true is that we must admit that 
the antecedent of the whole conditional is 
false. Therefore, we must admit that God 
exists. 
Yet another counterexample was 
advanced by. Imagine a lawyer that tried to 
utilise the classical logic to defend his client 
– curiously, we can also suppose that the 
judge made a basic course of Logic I, just to 
follow the argumentation. The lawyer, 
admitting that his client was encountered in 
the crime scene, could argue that the fact 
that the accused was found on the crime 
scene is not a sufficient condition for his 
culpability. He could represent this 
affirmation by means of a conditional ‘It is 
not the case that if the accuser was found on 
the crime scene, he is guilt’. It is clear that 
from this we could infer the surprising 
conclusion ‘The accused was found on the 
crime scene and is not guilty’. However, to 
avoid this surprising conclusion we could 
not reinterpret the denied conditional as ‘If 
the accused was found on the crime scene, 
he is not guilty’, since that would imply that 
being found on the crime scene is a 
sufficient condition for innocence, which is 
not the case . 10
 Stevenson (1970: 28).8
 Edgington (1986: 16). The authorship of the counter-example is attributed to W.D. Hart (Edgington, 1986: 37, 9
footnote 6).
 Klinger (1971: 191).10
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The root of these counter-examples 
result from the already mentioned tension 
between the material account and our 
common epistemic practices. The material 
account rests on extensional calculus, which 
works under an assumption of omniscience 
logic, i.e., that the evaluator of the 
conditional knows the truth-values of its 
propositional constituents, but in practice 
the evidence that is usually available when 
we evaluate a conditional is intensional. 
When we evaluate A → B, we usually do 
not know if A and B are true or not. If I 
want to establish whether John wasn’t late 
to work if he left his home late, we need to 
consider how the traffic was today, etc. 
However, our eventual ignorance about the 
truth-values of A and B are completely 
ignored by the extensional calculus. This 
explains why it is intuitive to think that A 
and ¬B entails ¬(A → B), but the converse 
is not intuitively true: the extensional 
evidence is sufficient to discard the 
conditional, but the refusal of the 
conditional can be motivated by intensional 
evidence depending of the epistemic 
situation of the evaluator. 
It is not surprising then that some 
authors may even suggest that the type of 
conditional negation should vary according 
to the epistemic state of the evaluator. Thus, 
it was argued that the negation of A → B 
should be interpreted as A&¬B only when 
the evaluator is sufficiently informed or 
confident in the truth values of A and B. 
Otherwise, the negation of A → B must be a 
conditional negation such as A → ¬B or A 
→ ◇¬B. A → ¬B should be the choice if the 
evaluator has enough information to believe 
that the possibilities described by the 
antecedent are enough to exclude the 
consequent. If not, the conditional negation 
should be A → ◇¬B . 11
However, this suggestion and the 
counterexamples against conditional 
negation commit an ignoratio elenchi, since 
they confuse the question about which 
evidence can be used to support a 
proposition with the question about the truth 
conditions that constitute the truth or falsity 
of a conditional . In other words, what 12
interest us is knowing what makes an 
indicative conditional true and not how 
someone decides whether to believe in a 
conditional or not . The counterexamples 13
assume that the material account should 
provide the belief conditions of conditionals 
instead of its truth conditions , but we 14
should not confuse our claims about what is 
unacceptable or acceptable with claims 
about what is true, since the first relies on 
the evidence available to the epistemic 
agent about the proposition, but the second 
relies on the truth-conditions of the 
proposition in case . For the same reason, a 15
valid argumentative form should preserve 
truth, not grounds for believing . If 16
conditional negation does not preserve 
grounds for believing, that is irrelevant from 
a logic point of view. 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n e x p l a i n s w h y 
Stevenson’s and Edgington’s arguments 
have the same general structure: they start 
with a reasoning that is intensional based, 
which is then mixed with extensional one in 
order to extract a counterintuitive 
conclusion. But this is a sophisticated form 
of cheating, since for reasons of coherence, 
t h e r e a s o n i n g t h a t m o t i v a t e s t h e 
counterexamples should be entirely 
intensional. But then we cannot provide 
 Egré and Politzer (2013: 11).11
 Richards (1969).12
 Pace Stalnaker (1968: 100).13
 Chakraborti (2003: 168).14
 Armstrong, Moor & Fogelin (1990: 10–14).15
 Sinnott-Armostrong, Moor and Fogelin (1986: 300).16
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genuine counterexamples to classical 
negation relying entirely on intensional 
grounds. Intensional thinking will interpret 
examples of ex terna l nega t ion of 
conditionals as examples of internal 
negation of conditionals, i.e., examples ¬(A 
→ B) are best interpreted as A → ¬B. 
However, if people tend to interpret ¬(A → 
B) as A → ¬B, there is no real counter-
example against classical negation of 
conditionals, since A& ¬B doesn’t follow 
from A → ¬B. The reasoner then is not 
denying A → B, but is actually asserting a 
different conditional, A → ¬B . 17
T h e r e a r e o t h e r c r i t i c i s m s t o 
Edgington’s argument, which is interpreted 
as follows: (1) If God does not exist, then it 
is not the case that if I pray my prayers will 
be answered by Him. (2) I do not pray. 
Therefore, God exists. First, it can be 
argued that the formalisation of the first 
premise is mistaken. (1) should actually be 
interpreted as (1*): ¬E ⊃  (P&¬A), then if 
God does not exist, the speaker is 
committing himself to pray, but this is 
implausible, since the speaker, by means of 
(2), already discarded this possibility. 
Intuitively, the speaker does not pray with 
the objective of making (1) true in case God 
does not exist. If that were the case, the 
non-existence of God would lead to a 
contradiction: ‘I pray and I do not pray’. 
The truth of ‘I pray’ comes from the 
consequent in (1*): ‘P&¬A’, and the truth of 
‘I do not pray’ comes directly from (2).   
Moreover, (1*) is equivalent to ‘(¬P ∨ 
A) ⊃  E’, but certainly the speaker does not 
want to say that this refuse to pray is 
sufficient to establish the existence of God. 
On the other hand, is reasonable to assume 
that the meaning of (1) is the following: ‘If 
God does not exist, then if I pray my 
prayers will be ignored by Him’. The 
formalisation then is ‘¬E ⊃ (P ⊃ I)’, which 
is in agreement with our intuitions: the 
speaker is not committed with a pray. From 
these premises it does not follow neither E 
nor ¬E. (1) is equivalent to‘(P&¬I) ⊃ E’ and 
‘(¬E&P) ⊃  U’, and both are intuitively 
acceptable . 18
The Klinger counter-example can also 
be disarmed with the observation that the 
consequent has a modal operator of 
possibility implicit in the consequent. When 
this modal operator is specified, the 
conditional is more reasonably interpreted 
as ‘It is not the case that if the accused was 
found on the crime scene, he cannot be 
innocent ’ . When we in terpre t the 
conditional in this manner, we can do justice 
to the lawyer’s argument, while we 
eliminate the counter-intuitive aspect of the 
correspondent conjunction, which should be 
interpreted as ‘The accused was found on 
the crime scene and he can be innocent’. 
The reinterpretation of the negation of the 
conditional as internal will also be 
plausible: ‘If the accused was found on the 
crime scene, he could be innocent’.  
Perhaps another reason why classical 
negation can be counter-intuitive lies in the 
fact that it allows us to infer a conjunction 
from the denial of a conditional. This may 
seem unacceptable at first, because 
conjunctions are categorical assertions 
about facts, i.e., A&B is an assertion about A 
and B, while conditionals can be interpreted 
as mere conditional assertions, i.e., A → B 
is a conditional assertion of B given the 
assumption A. Thus, it would be intuitive to 
assume that the negation of A → B must be 
A → ¬B, since the negation of a conditional 
would have to be a conditional itself. This 
reasoning, however, assumes the fallacy of 
confusing the negation of an assertion with 
the assertion of what is being negated. This 
 Fulda (2005: 1421); Richards (1969: 421); Lycan (2005: 91).17
 Ortiz (2010: 2).18
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occurs in other cases, for instance, when we 
wrongly assume that the denial of a 
conjunction ¬(A&B) is equivalent to the 
conjunction with both its conjuncts denied 
¬A&¬B, since both have a similar logical 
form. This is a mistake, since the negation 
of a conjunction is not a conjunction with 
negated conjuncts, but a disjunction with 
the form ¬A∨¬B. Other mistake is to think 
that the negation of A ∨ B is ¬A ∨ ¬B, when 
in fact is ¬A&¬B, or to think that the 
negation of ‘All As are Bs’ is ‘All As are not 
Bs’, when in fact is ‘Some As are not Bs’ . 19
The controversies about the negation of 
conditionals are no different. It is common 
to think that negation of A → B is A → ¬B, 
but this a mistake, since the negation of a 
conditional is not a conditional with a 
negated consequent, but the negation of a 
conjunction with the form ¬(A&¬B).  
This is expected since it is known that 
many of our intuitions associated with the 
logical form of complex propositions are 
confused. For example, some recent studies 
in conditional reasoning indicate that people 
have many difficulties to understand the 
negation of conditionals. The negation of A 
→ B can be interpreted not only as A&¬B 
and A → ¬B, but also ¬A → ¬B, ¬A&¬B, 
¬A&B and even A&B . Another study 20
report differences depending on whether the 
conditional sentence is in the past tense, or 
the future tense . Naturally, these intuitions 21
about logical form may indirectly reinforce 
the intuitions about the use of intensional 
evidence, but both are unfounded.     
5. A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM 
The puta t ive counter- ins tances of 
hypothetical syllogism also highlight the 
tension between intensional evidence and 
extensional evidence. Consider the 
following example:  
(1) If I knock this typewriter off the 
desk then it will fall. 
(2) If it falls then it is heavier than air. 
(3) If I knock this typewriter off the 
desk then it is heavier than air. 
(4) If the typewriter is heavier than air 
then an elephant is heavier than air. 
(5) If I knock this typewriter off the 
desk then an elephant is heavier than air. 
From (1)-(4) hypothetical syllogism . 22
The problem in this case is that while 
there are intensional evidences to accept 
(1)-(4), the only evidence to accept (5) is 
extensional, i.e., the assurance that both its 
antecedent and consequent are true given 
the inference by hypothetical syllogism on 
previous propositions. The intuition that 
supports the counter-example is that while 
there are intensional evidence to accept the 
premises from (1)-(4), there are only 
extensional evidence to accept the 
conclusion, namely, the facts that both the 
antecedent and consequent are true.  This 
intuition can be criticising for assuming 
without argument that the only evidence to 
accept a conditional is of the intensional 
kind. Once this misunderstanding is 
clarified, it becomes perfectly natural  to 
accept the conclusion on extensional 
grounds. 
 Rescher (2007: 51–52).19
 Espino & Byrne (2012).20
 Handley, Evans and Thomson (2006).21
 Dale (1972: 439–440).22
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6. COUNTEREXAMPLES TO OR-TO-IF 
Another example involves the inferential 
form A ∨ B ⊨ ¬A → B, commonly known as 
Or-to-If. Now consider an instance of this 
inferential form in the following context: 
suppose that there are two balls placed in a 
bag, labelled as a and b. The only thing we 
know is that one of these balls are red, but 
we do not know which one. In this case, we 
accept that ‘either a is red, or b is red’, and 
feel entitled to infer from this that ‘if a is 
not red, b is red’. Now suppose that the 
context can be modified a little bit. We 
know that ball a comes from a collection in 
which 99% of the balls are red, but we do 
not have any reason to think that b is red. 
Maybe b comes from a collection in which 
only 1% of the balls are red. My confidence 
that a is red justifies my belief that ‘either a 
is red, or b is red’, but does not justify the 
conclusion that ‘if a is not red, b is red’ . 23
It is not difficult to explain why our 
intuitions are different in the two contexts. 
In the first context, there is nothing weird 
about inferring the conditional from the 
disjunction, because the evidence to accept 
the two are intensional. There is no 
evidential tension involved because the type 
of evidence employed in both cases is the 
same. In the second context, the evidence to 
accept the disjunction ‘either a is red, or b is 
red’ is extensional, i.e., the assumption that 
a is red, but this evidence does not seem 
sufficient to justify the conclusion that ‘if a 
is not red, b is red’. In other words, while 
extensional evidence seems sufficient to 
accept a disjunction, intuitively is not 
sufficient to accept a conditional, for it is 
assumed that we need intensional evidence 
to establish a connection between the 
antecedent and the consequent.   
The reason why someone would be lead 
to this mistake is that the conditional seems 
to transport us to a context in which the 
antecedent is assumed as true. Since the 
extensional evidence in this case consists in 
the falsity of the antecedent, it is 
automatically discarded as irrelevant. But 
the assumption that conditionals cannot be 
justified by extensional evidence is 
controversial, to say the least. 
This dynamic also explains why some 
instances of Or-to-If attract no criticism. For 
instance: ‘Either the butler or the gardener 
did it. Therefore, if the butler didn't do it, 
the gardener did’. This example is 
intuitively valid because the intensional 
grounds that are used to accept the 
disjunction (facts about the crime, main 
suspects, etc.) are the same that are used to 
accept the conclusion.  
This also happens when the reasons 
involved are extensional. Consider the 
following example: ‘I can say to my 
children at some stage in a treasure hunt, 
The prize is either in the garden or in the 
attic. I know that because I know where I 
put it, but I m not going to tell you’. In this 
context is obvious to the children that the 
grounds for accepting the disjunction is that 
the speaker knows a particular disjunct to be 
true . What is interesting is that this 24
disjunction is intuitively equivalent to the 
following conditional, ‘If the prize is not in 
the garden, is in the attic’, which can be also 
accepted in the same situation due to 
extensional reasons alone.  
But the reason why Or-to-If seems 
intuitively valid is misguided in both cases. 
This inferential form is indeed valid, but 
because it perseveres the truth of the 
 Edgington (1987: 55–56).23
 Grice (1989: 44–45).24
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premise and not because it preserves the grounds for believing in the premise.    
7. THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERFACTUALS 
How can we verify a conditional with 
extensional evidence when the antecedent is 
contrary-to-fact? This once popular  25
philosophical problem is now completely 
ignored. The reason for this indifference is 
that most philosophers nowadays think that 
the truth conditions of counterfactuals must 
be explained by a non-material alternative 
that will dissolve the problem. Enthusiasts 
of extensional evidence, however, have a 
reason to bring this problem back into the 
fold. Consider the following example: 
suppose that my friend almost touched a 
live wire. I say, with a sign of relief: ‘If you 
had touched that wire, you would get an 
electric shock’. How are we supposed to 
confirm the conditional if you did not touch 
the wire? The material answer is obvious: if 
the conditional has a false antecedent, it is 
vacuously true. Yet there is the intuition that 
this answer is too easy, since what really 
interest us is knowing whether she would 
get a electric shock in a hypothetical 
circumstance where she touched the wire. 
The extensional evidence will keep us in the 
dark, since it is tied to the way things 
actually are and not how the could be in a 
hypothetical circumstance.  
One solution that seems perfectly suited 
to explain such cases is the Ramsey’s test. 
The test states that we accept A → B if, and 
only if, after the hypothetical addition of A 
to our belief system, and after making the 
r equ i r ed ad jus tmen t s t o ma in t a in 
consistency without modifying the 
hypothetical belief in A, we would be 
willing to accept B . The example 26
mentioned above will then be explained as 
follows: the conditional ‘If you had touched 
that wire, you would get an electric shock’ 
is acceptable if after the hypothetical 
addition to our belief system of a situation 
where she touches the wire and required 
adjustments of consistency, we would be 
willing to infer that she gets a electric 
shock. Otherwise we will not accept the 
conditional. Thus, it becomes possible to 
test or verify whether the consequence of 
the antecedent expressed by the conditional 
would realize in the proper circumstances 
by means of a hypothetical alternate. 
Another way to describe the test is as 
follows: during the evaluation of A → B, the 
hypothetical addition of A is viewed as an 
opportunity to test the relation between the 
hypothesis, A, and its prediction, B. If we 
are willing to infer B after the hypothetical 
addition of A, the relation between the 
hypothesis and the prediction is confirmed. 
If B turns out to be false when A is true, the 
relation between the hypothesis and its 
prediction is refuted. If A does not occur, I 
do not confirm nor refute the relation 
between the hypothesis and its prediction, 
since I do not have the available reasons to 
evaluate the conditional. 
One criticism is that the notion that the 
Ramsey’s test can provide an acceptability 
criterion of conditionals is that it gets things 
backwards. It is not that we should consider 
whether we would be willing to infer B after 
the hypothetical assumption of A to decide 
whether A → B is acceptable or not, but 
instead we would be willing to infer B after 
the hypothetical assumption of A if we 
already accept the conditional. The test 
seem plausible in the example above 
 Chisholm (1946), Goodman (1947), Will (1947), Watling (1957), Walters (1961), Tredwell (1965).  25
 Stalnaker (1968: 102). The original formulation can be found in Ramsey (1929: 143).26
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because it can be applied effortlessly to 
conditionals that are known to be true due to 
independent reasons. I know that given 
standard conditions, a person will get a 
electric shock after touching a live wire. 
Given those assumptions, I would be 
willing to infer the consequent after the 
hypothetical assumption of the antecedent, 
but only because I already decided that the 
conditional was true in the first place.  
Now, given the lack of independent 
reasons to determine whether a conditional 
is acceptable or not, the test will be 
ineffective. Consider the following pair of 
conditionals : 27
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, 
Bizet would have been Italian.  
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, 
Verdi would have been French.  
I cannot tell if Bizet would be Italian or if 
Verdi would be French under the 
hypothetical assumption that Bizet and 
Verdi are compatriots because the available 
evidence does not point in one direction or 
the other. The test fails.  
The same pessimistic diagnostics can be 
extended to other theories that are heavily 
inspired by the Ramsey’s test, such as the 
suppositional view and possible world 
theories . Let’s consider the suppositional 28
view, according to which conditionals are 
not propositions, but acts of conditional 
assertion. The idea is that there is no 
assertion of A → B, but an assertion of B 
given the assumption of A. The theory is 
powerless to guide us in the Bizet-Verdi 
example because we have no way of 
knowing whether we would assert that Bizet 
would be Italian or that Verdi would be 
French given the assumption that Bizet and 
Verdi are compatriots. The same criticism 
applies to possible world theories, according 
to which A → B is true iff the closest A-
world is a B-world . There is no way of 29
knowing whether Bizet would be Italian or 
Verdi would be French in the closest world 
where Bizet and Verdi are compatriots.  
Thus, it seems that the alternatives do 
not represent such an improvement over the 
material account. Besides, they are 
motivated by a wrong expectations about 
the role of logic. The task of a conditional 
logic is to provide the truth conditions of the 
conditional and not the counterfactual 
circumstances where we could test whether 
the consequent would follow from the 
antecedent’s truth. To insist that extensional 
evidence is not enough is to assume that 
logic should provide answers to matters of 
fact that are completely irrelevant from a 
logic point of view. Intensional evidence is 
a purely epistemic phenomenon related to a 
cognitive agent particular beliefs and should 
have no bearings on logical matters.  
One of the main reasons that lead us to 
the prevailing idea that subjunctives are not 
material is that the vast majority of 
subjunctive conditionals are asserted under 
the assumption that their antecedents are 
false. If they were all material, it would 
follow that the vast majority of subjunctive 
conditionals are vacuously true. But this 
line of reasoning can be questioned using 
the same line of reasoning that material 
account theorists already employ regarding 
indica t ive condi t ionals wi th fa l se 
antecedents. A large number of indicative 
conditionals have false antecedents, but any 
material account proponent would admit 
that: (1) most indicative conditionals are 
 Quine (1982: 23).27
 Stalnaker is pretty clear on this: ‘The concept of a possible world is just what we need to make this transition 28
[from belief conditions of the Ramsey’s test to the truth conditions of a semantics], since a possible world is the 
ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs’ (Stalnaker, 1968: 102).
 Or iff all the closest A-worlds are B-worlds, if you choose Lewis over Stalnaker.29
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vacuously true, (2) their counter-intuitive 
aspects can be explained away by pragmatic 
means, and (3) the fact that they are in large 
numbers is irrelevant to the question. If 
these answers can be plausible in this case, 
they will also be plausible if most 
subjunctive conditionals are vacuously true. 
The fact that there are even more vacuously 
true subjunctives than vacuously true 
indicatives does not affect the strength of 
the argument.  
8. THE CHEATING PARTNER EXAMPLE 
It is intuitive to think that A → B is 
acceptable when A ⊃  B is robust with 
respect to A, i.e., when Pr(A ⊃  B) is high 
and would remain high after learning that 
A . This implies that A → B is acceptable 30
when it is employable on a modus ponens 
inference. This assumption faces the 
following counter-example: Suppose I’m 
certain that I would never know that my 
wife is deceiving me; she is too smart to get 
caught. However, because I trust her, I don’t 
believe she is deceiving me. In this case, the 
conditional probability that I don’t know 
that she is deceiving me given that she is 
deceiving me is high. Nevertheless, I would 
not infer that I don’t know that she is 
deceiving me given that I found out that she 
is deceiving me (Van Fraassen, 1980: 503). 
In this case, the conditional ‘If my wife is 
deceiving him, I would never know’ is 
acceptable, but it is not employable on a 
modus ponens.  
Bennett attempts to explain this counter-
example by arguing that the speaker will not 
be willing to employ the conditional in a 
modus ponens but believes that any other 
person that accepts the conditional would be 
willing to employ it on a modus ponens . 31
But this explanation is ad hoc and only 
clouds the issue. 
What happens is that conditionals with 
the form ‘If A, I will never know A’ can 
never be employed in a modus ponens by 
the speakers who are asserting them. The 
reason is that to employ this conditional on 
a modus ponens would require extensional 
evidence that falsifies the conditional. It 
was the intensional evidence that lead the 
speaker to accept the conditional, but the 
conditional can only be employed in a 
modus ponens due to the admission of 
falsifying extensional evidence.  
9. ADAM PAIRS 
The Apartheid thesis states that indicative 
and subjunctive conditionals have different 
truth conditions. One of the main arguments 
that have been presented to support this 
thesis are the Adam pairs. Consider the 
following pair of conditionals:  
 (1) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, 
someone else did.  
 (2) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, 
someone else would have.  
 Intuitively, these conditionals have different 
truth conditions. After all, in order to accept 
 Jackson (1987: 28).30
 Bennett (2003: 55).31
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(1) is enough to know that Kennedy was 
killed by someone, but to accept (2) is 
necessary to assume a conspiracy theory 
regarding its murder . 32
The intuitive discrepancy between the 
Adam pairs is due to a discrepancy in 
supposedly available intensional evidence 
for each conditional. The intensional 
evidence that someone killed Kennedy and 
Oswald is the main suspect is enough to 
accept (1), but it is not sufficient to accept 
(2). This happens because the assertion of 
(2) suggests to its grammatical form that the 
speaker is already committed with the 
extensional evidence that Oswald is the 
killer and, thus, would require the stronger 
intensional evidence that someone would 
had killed Kennedy if necessary. 
Against this reasoning it could be 
argued that the evidence that supports (1) 
not only is not intensional, but also entails 
both (1) and (2). The fact that Kennedy was 
killed by someone appears to be intensional 
evidence, while in fact is an extensional 
evidence. The conditional ‘If Oswald did 
not kill Kennedy, someone else did’ depends 
on whether Kennedy was killed, and thus on 
whether Kennedy was killed by someone. If 
the logical form of the proposition 
‘Someone killed Kennedy’ is represented as 
(∃x)Fx, the logical form of the proposition 
‘Oswald did not kill Kennedy’ can be 
represented as ¬Fa. If we apply the 
existential instantiation rule to the first 
propositional form, we have Fb, and this 
together with ¬Fa give us (a ≠ b) by 
indiscernibi l i ty of ident ica ls . The 
conjunction then gives us Fb & (a ≠ b) and 
by applying the existential generalisation 
we have (∃x)Fx & (a ≠ x), which is the 
logical form of the consequent of the 
conditional. Thus, the conditional is entailed 
by its consequent. Now suppose that the 
antecedent of the conditional is false. Thus, 
it is true that Oswald killed Kennedy, and, 
therefore, that someone killed Kennedy. 
Therefore, the conditional will again be 
true . 33
The next step is to show that (1) and (2) 
are entailed by the same evidence. Since (1) 
is entailed by (∃x)Fx & (a ≠ x), (2) is also 
entailed by it because it has the same logical 
form, namely, ¬Fa  → (∃x)Fx & (a ≠ x). If 
things seem different is probably due to our 
linguistic habits of interpreting subjunctive 
conditionals as being asserted under the 
assumption that the antecedent is false, but 
these habits should have no bearings in 
logical matters.  
10. CONDITIONAL STAND-OFFS 
Conditionals stand-off are another particular 
instance of the tension between intensional 
and extensional evidence. In very loose 
terms, stand offs occur when one individual 
has grounds to accept ‘A → B’, while 
another has equally compelling grounds to 
accept what seems to be the opposite 
conditional, ‘A → ¬B’. If conditionals have 
truth conditions, ‘A → B’ and ‘A → ¬B’ 
cannot both be true, because they seem 
contradictory. The reasoning then is that in 
order for one of the conditionals to be false, 
someone would have to make a mistake 
about the facts of the case. However, both 
 Lewis (1973: 3). This example is a modification of the original example presented by Adams (1970: 90). 32
Hence the name ‘Adam pairs’.  
 Mellor (1993: 238–239). In fact, it could be said that the premise ‘Someone killed Kennedy’ not only entails, 33
but is logically equivalent to the conclusion, ‘If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did’; since there are 
no circumstances in which the conditional is true and the negation of the premise, namely, ‘No one killed 
Kennedy’, is true (Lowe, 1979: 139–140). See also Johnston (1996: 99–100).
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individuals have perfect good reasons to 
accept each conditional. If none of them is 
making a mistake, none of them is saying 
something false. Therefore, conditionals 
have no truth conditions. This puzzle is 
evidenced in the following example : 34
Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on 
a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to Pete 
to call or fold. My henchman Zack sees 
Stone's hand, which is quite good, and 
signals its content to Pete. My henchman 
Jack sees both hands, and sees that Pete's 
hand is rather low, so that Stone's is the 
winning hand. At this point, the room is 
cleared. (…) Zack knows that Pete knew 
Stone's hand. He can thus appropriately 
assert “If Pete called, he won.” Jack knows 
that Pete held the losing hand, and thus can 
appropriately assert “If Pete called, he lost.” 
From this, we can see that neither is 
asserting anything false. 
There is a caveat with this example though. 
It is arguable that the example is not really 
symmetric because Jack has better reasons 
to justify his belief than Zack. This lead to 
attempts to offer new stand off examples 
which ensured perfect symmetry :  35
In a game, (1) all red square cards are worth 
10 points, and (2) all large square cards are 
worth nothing. X caught a glimpse as Z 
picked a card and saw that it was red. 
Knowing (1), he believes “If Z picked a 
square card, it’s worth 10 points”. Y, seeing 
it bulging under Z’s jacket, where Z is 
keeping it out of view, knows it’s large. 
Knowing (2), he believes “If Z picked a 
square card, it’s worth nothing”. 
What we are supposed to make of this 
example? What justifies X’s and Y’s beliefs 
is the available intensional evidence, which 
is inconclusive and heavily dependent on 
their particular epistemic situations. But is 
the extensional evidence determined by the 
facts of the case, namely whether Z picked a 
square card that is worth 10 points or not. 
That is what will ultimately set the issue and 
determine whether each conditional is true 
or not. Once the truth-values kick in, the 
symmetry disappears. It is a non-issue. 
These conditionals are objectively false or 
objectively true, and their truth values are 
determined by asymmetrical facts. 
  
11. THE BURGLAR’S PUZZLE 
Consider the following sentences:  
(1) If Alf was the burglar, we’ll find his 
fingerprints in the room. 
(2) If Sid was the mastermind, we won’t 
find any fingerprints in the room. 
Someone could accept both (1) and (2) 
without knowing (3): 
(3) Alf was the robber but Sid was the 
mastermind. 
  
Thus, it would be improper for that 
person to deny the conjunction of the 
antecedents since she doesn’t whether (3) is 
false or not. However, the denial of (3) is 
entailed by the simultaneous acceptance of 
(1)-(2), for it is the truth that Alf was the 
robber and Sid was the mastermind, it 
follows that we’ll find Alf fingerprints in 
the room and we won’t find any fingerprints 
in the room. What is the problem here?   36
A detective could endorse both (1) and 
(2) because she is not working with the 
 Gibbard (1981: 226–32).34
 Edgington (1995: 294).35
 Ramachadran (2016: 29).36
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truth-values of the antecedent and the 
consequent, but with the intensional 
evidence associated with the behaviour of 
Alf and Sid. That’s why she can ignore (3), 
because she is not making any inferences 
based on the antecedents yet. However, 
once the truth-values are settled, for 
instance, Sid confessed being the 
mastermind, she will have to conclude that 
there aren’t any fingerprints in the room, 
thus abandoning (3) and the antecedent of 
(1).  
This puzzle results from a tension 
between our use of intensional evidence and 
the actual truth-values of the components 
that have logical significance. When you are 
dealing with evidence, you are ignoring 
attribution of truth-values for the most part. 
It doesn’t mean that you are actually entitled 
to maintain this attitude once the truth-
values are revealed. (1) and (2) are co-
tenable when you are considering the 
evidence to accept the connection between 
the antecedent and the consequent of each 
conditional, but are not co-tenable if the 
antecedent of one of them turns out to be 
true. You have evidence to think that if the 
antecedent of each pair is true, the 
consequent will be true, but you don’t have 
evidence to accept the antecedent of each 
conditional when you initially accept both. 
We could say that there are two levels of 
evidentially. The first involves the 
acceptance of a conditional based on 
intensional reasons that there is a 
connection between the antecedent and 
consequent. The second involves the actual 
truth-values, or a mix of truth-values and 
intensional evidence, e.g., if you that the 
antecedent is true and have good reasons to 
accept that there is a connection between 
antecedent and consequent, you must accept 
one of the conditionals and drop the other. 
What matters is the truth-values of the 
antecedent and the consequent and not the 
intensional evidence. The second level of 
evidentiality always trumps over the first.    
12. THE OPT-OUT PROPERTY  
Bennett argues that indicative conditionals 
have what he calls ‘the confidence 
property’: if A → B is accepted given the 
ceteris paribus conditions, learning that A 
would lead one to infer B . However, he 37
believes that this property is lacking in most 
subjunctive conditionals. He presents the 
following example to illustrate this 
phenomenon: 
In 1970 I went to the University of British 
Columbia, where I worked for nine years; I 
am sure that if I had not gone to UBC I 
would have left Canada. However, I am not 
even slightly disposed to infer, upon 
learning that I did not go to UBC, that I left 
Canada. On the contrary, if “I did not go to 
UBC” is added to my belief system with its 
multitude of seeming memories of life 
there, the resulting system implies that I 
have gone mad and cannot tell what I did in 
1970 . 38
The conditional ‘If I had not gone to UBC I 
would have left Canada’ has what he calls 
‘the Opt-out Property’. It can be accepted 
by someone who assumes that the 
antecedent is false, but would be dropped in 
the minute he learns its antecedent’s truth. 
The speaker would opt out of the 
conditional. This implies that if a 
conditional has the Confidence Property, it 
doesn’t have the Opt-out Property.  
 Bennett (1995: 340).37
 Bennett (1995: 340).38
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One problem with this explanation is 
that subjunctive conditionals are sometimes 
asserted precisely because the speaker 
wants to reinforce his belief in the truth of 
the antecedent, e.g., ‘I think she took 
arsenic; for she has symptoms X, Y, and Z, 
and these are just the symptoms she would 
have if she had taken arsenic’ . Bennett see 39
no problem in admitting that a conditional 
with the Opt-out Property may be accepted 
by someone who believes in its antecedent 
and obsess that ‘I am not denying that. I say 
merely that a conditional which has the 
Property can be comfortably accepted by 
someone who is entirely confident that the 
antecedent is false; that is an aspect of the 
meaning of such a conditional’ . But this 40
answer is unsatisfactory. If subjunctives had 
an Opt-out property that is characteristic of 
their meaning, they couldn’t be turned off 
wherever the speaker sees fit.  
The reasons that lead Bennet to accept 
the conditional includes abundant evidence 
about what is actually the case, including 
the extensional evidence that he went to 
UBC, and intensional evidence about what 
would be the case if his choices were 
different in the past. To realise that the 
antecedent is actually false would 
undermine extensional evidence that lead 
him to accept the conditional in the first 
place. It would be an incoherence.  
There is also something to be said about 
the relationship between evidence and 
inferential employability, namely, that our 
inferential dispositions are determined by 
the evidence that lead us to accept the 
conditional. For example, some conditionals 
are accepted only when we are willing to 
employ the conditional in a modus tollens 
inference, instead of a modus ponens. When 
I accept ‘If John’s speaking the truth, I'm a 
Dutchman’, I am not willing to infer that I 
am a Dutchman if it turns out that John was 
telling the truth: the conditional was 
asserted under the assumption that the 
antecedent is false. Or considered the 
already mentioned cheating partner 
example. When I accept the conditional ‘If 
my wife is deceiving me, I will never 
know’, I am not willing to infer that I will 
never know that she is deceiving me if I 
found out that she is deceiving me after all.  
13. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The truth conditions of connectives in 
classical logic is simplified and striped of 
all psychological and epistemic factors, 
which includes the role of intensional 
evidence and epistemic states of imperfect 
information. But it is precisely this 
simplification that generated many of its 
counter-intuitive aspects. It is appealing to 
think that the material conditional is not an 
adequate representation of the logical 
properties of conditionals in natural 
language, if we assume that its logical 
properties must include our epistemic 
practices.  
 But those contrary intuitions have a 
epistemic bent and should be criticised for 
that. Logic is about the truth-conditions of 
propositions, which are determined by the 
metaphysical substrate that is responsible 
for the truth-values of its propositional 
components. This substrate, and therefore 
their truth-values of its propositional 
components, are largely independent of 
epistemic agents, their epistemic situation, 
 Anderson (1951: 37).39
 Bennett (1995: 341).40
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degrees of confidence, etc. Belief 
conditions, intensional evidence and 
preservation of grounds for believing are 
epistemic phenomena that are affected by 
the epistemic agent’s ignorance. Truth 
preservation is a semantic phenomenon, 
which is independent of the epistemic agent 
ignorance. Semantics always trumps 
epistemic ignorance. If intensional evidence 
and grounds for believing preservation 
clashes against extensional evidence and 
truth preservation, so much the worse for 
the first.  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